Singular reference review of some theories and problems
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Date
2021
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University of Calcutta
Abstract
The problem of reference is a central issue in philosophy of language. For philosophers of
language typically think that the principal way in which language attaches to reality is through
reference. And they also hold that reference to objects especially to one, single, particular object plays
a crucial role in linking word to world. Hence it is found that there has been a great surge of interest
amongst the philosophers in the problem of singular reference. In my present study I shall be primarily
concerned with proper names which refer to their objects uniquely and singularly and are therefore
regarded as paradigm examples of singular reference.
My object in this work is to explain thoroughly and examine critically the theories of singular
reference, particularly reference of proper names, as offered by Mill, Frege, Russell, Searle, Strawson,
Donnellan, Kripke, Putnam and Evans with special reference two central issues : a) What exactly is the
mechanism of reference of a proper name ? b) Is there any criterion of correct application of a proper
name to an object ? The theories offered in this connection fall into two heads : i) no-sense theory of
proper name ii) sense theory of proper name.
In Introduction the problem of singular reference has been explained.
In Chapter One Mill’s theory of singular reference has been explained and examined.
Chapter Two deals with an exposition and evaluation of Frege’s view on singular reference
with reference to his distinction between sense and reference.
Chapter Three contains Russell’s theory of singular reference and a critical appraisal of his
theory.
Chapter Four is devoted to Strawson’s theory of singular reference. His polemic against
Russell’s theory is also explained and examined in this connection. Donnellan’s observations on the
Russell-Strawson controversy as well as his historical explanation theory of proper names is discussed
in this connection.
In Chapter Five the causal chain account of proper name as offered by Kripke and Putnam has
been explained and examined with reference to Evans’ objections. Evans’ amendment of Kripke’s
causal chain account is also discussed in this context.
My thesis is that none of the theories of proper name (singular reference) can adequately
explain how proper names function in their variety of uses and can provide us with a satisfactory
criterion of application of a proper name. On balance it seems that a satisfactory theory of proper name
must to incorporate insights drawn both from sense and no-sense theories of proper name. Evans’
theory, in spite of some flaws I think, is tolerably satisfactory . For it attempts to combine both the sense
and no-sense theories.